

Dear Bob:

Your letter concerning the intelligence estimates on Soviet ground forces raises some very interesting points about their reliability, consistency and ranges of uncertainty. I agree that we need a thorough study to evaluate all available information concerning the aspects of Soviet ground forces specified in your letter, and we are proceeding as follows:

1. A panel of CIA and DIA personnel has been established. The participation of one or two qualified people from your staff as observers would aid us in interpreting your requirements for information and in obtaining US cost data for comparative purposes. They would also help you in evaluating the results of the study.
2. This panel is responsible for reviewing all pertinent evidence and preparing a thorough and objective study on manpower, equipment, costs, and the qualitative aspects of Soviet ground forces. I plan to ask the Board of National Estimates to review this study, and of course General Carroll and I will review it.
3. Wherever possible, the ranges of uncertainty will be treated explicitly according to the definitiveness and the reliability of the evidence.
4. A preliminary report will be forwarded to you in August, and at this point we will decide on the type of long run program that will best serve to improve our estimates in this field. ~~SECRET~~

I would like to comment on some of the substantive statements in your letter. In evaluating Soviet ~~army~~ ^{land} forces there is the danger of inferring that the Soviets have the same doctrine on

organization and employment of forces as the US. Even in 1959, the combat tasks envisioned by the US and the USSR for their ground divisions resulted in different organizational and deployment postures; recent changes appear to have increased these differences. For example, Soviet divisional strengths are far below those of either the US pentomic or ROAD divisions. It is now estimated that there are about half as many men in a typical combat ready Soviet tank division as there are in a typical US armored division. Other significant differences exist in procurement policy, logistic support, and mobilization concepts.

In reply to your request for information on how the Soviets are allocating their military expenditures, I have attached to this letter a recent CIA study prepared in support of NIE 11-4-63 which is currently in process. This study includes estimates of expenditures by mission and category in terms which are as comparable to those of the US as Soviet organization and data limitations permit. There is also an extensive section on the similarities and differences in the scope of US accounts and those used in the study. The study covers the period 1954 through 1967; however, the estimates for the future have a very wide range of uncertainty. The Agency has made similar studies annually for more than five years, and although the full details of such studies have not been included in National Intelligence Estimates, they have been used to assess the economic feasibility of estimated Soviet military programs. It was the long history of experience in this field which permitted the Agency to contribute the "costing" aspect of the work of the CIA-DIA Joint Analysis Group mentioned in your letter. Furthermore, another Estimate (NIE 11-4-63), recently completed, examines the problems facing the Soviet economy including the broader aspects of military and space programs.

Sincerely,

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/s/

John A. ...
Director of Central Intelligence

Honorable Robert F. McNamara
Secretary of Defense
Washington 25, D. C.